| Sl.No |
Title |
Act |
Date Of Judgement |
Subject |
Downloads |
| 1 |
THE GOVT. OF TAMIL NADU Vs. PV. ENTER. REP. BY SCM JAMULUDEEN & ORS. |
Indian Stamp Act 1899 |
21/11/2000 |
Indian Stamp Act, 1899-Section 27, 35, 47A-Circular issued by State
directing the authorities to register documents after inspection of
property and collection of amount-Validity of-Held, violative of the
provisions of the Act-Tamil Nadu Stamp (Prevention of Under Valuation of
Instruments) Rules, 1968-Rule 3.3.
State issued a circular directing the authorities to refuse registration of
documents relating to property if, after inspection, the value disclosed is
found undervalued and that registration should be done only after
collecting the stamp duty on correct valuation. Respondents challenged the
circular by filing writ petitions before the High Court, as being violative
of section 47A of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. The High Court quashed the
circular holding that the circular was violative of the provisions of the
Act. Hence the appeals by the State.
Appellant-State contended that section 27 read with section 35 of the
Indian Stamp Act, 1899 does not prevent the State from issuing circular to
inspect building and collection of amount before registration and that
there is existing legislative sanction in that regard. |
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| 2 |
CHILAKURI GANGULAPPA Vs. REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER, MADANPALLE AND ANR. |
Indian Stamp Act 1899 |
14/03/2001 |
Stamp Act, 1899 :
Sections 38(1), 40(1) and 47A-Procedure adopted when insufficiently stamped
document produced in court-Insufficiently stamped agreement to sell filed
in a civil suit to enforce the same-Document was impounded and for-warded
to R.D.O. who imposed penalty-Civil Judge dismissed appeal as deficient
court fees was not deposited till then-Single Judge dismissed revision
petition on same ground-On appeal Held, entire proceedings got misdirected
when the document was dispatched to R.D.O. as the same was never presented
for registration-When document is found insufficiently stamped court may
impose penalty and admit the document or forward the document to the
collector for taking adjudicatory steps, if the party refuses to pay the
deficient stamp duty-Since one of the required proceedings were adopted,
Munsif Court to reconsider the matter and proceed as per the required
procedure.
Section 40(1)(b)-Penalty of ten times is the upper limit and collector
shall consider all factors while deciding the proper amount.
Appellant had filed an insufficiently stamped agreement to sell, in a civil
suit before the Munsif Court to enforce the same. The instrument was
impounded and forwarded to the R.D.O., who was empowered by the Collector,
to take further action under Section 47A of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. A
penalty equivalent to ten times of the deficient stamp duty was imposed.
Senior Civil Judge dismissed the appeal against the order as not
maintainable because the order was not passed by the registering authority
and the procedure requiring payment of deficient stamp duty before
preferring an appeal was not followed. Single Judge dismissed the revision
petition as the deficient duty remained unpaid and no further time was
given to deposit the same. Appellants approached this Court after
depositing the deficient stamp duty. |
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| 3 |
Distt. Registrar & Collector, Hyderabad & Anr. Vs. Canara Bank Etc. |
Indian Stamp Act 1899 |
01/11/2004 |
Indian Stamp Act, 1899 as amended by the Andhra Pradesh and Telangana Act, 1986 (Act 17
of 1986): Section 73-Constitutionality of Constitution of India- Art. 14.
Stamp duty-Evasion-Safeguarding the revenue of the state-Public documents
or public records of private documents-In the custody of public officer-Not
tendered in evidence nor produced before any public office- Inspection,
impounding and levying with duty-Banks directed to remit deficit duty on
the documents, retained in course of loan advancing transactions, and to
recover the same from the parties concerned-Held, amended provision confers
unbridled power without any guidelines- Unreasonable, violative of Article
14 of the-Constitution-Hence ultra vires.
Constitution of India-Art. 21. |
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| 4 |
Dr. Chiranji Lal (D) By LRs. Vs. Hari Das (D) By LRs. |
Indian Stamp Acts 1899 |
13/05/2005 |
Limitation Act, 1963-Article 136-Decree passed in a partition suit-Period of limitation for execution of such decree commences from the date of the decree and not from the date of engrossment of the decree on the stamp paper-Engrossment of the decree on stamp paper would relate back to the date of the decree-Indian Stamp Act, 1899-Section 35.
In a suit for partition filed against the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants, final decree was passed on 7th August, 1981 in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents. There was no order of the Court directing the parties to furnish stamp papers for the purposes of engrossing the decree. The stamp papers required for engrossing the decree were furnished by respondents on 25th May, 1982 and the decree was engrossed thereafter. The execution application was filed on 21st March, 1994 in the High Court. The appellant raised objection that the execution application was barred by limitation in view of Article 136 of the Act, but the execution court rejected the objection. That order was upheld by the Division Bench in appeal, which held that unless and until the decree is engrossed on the stamp paper it is merely a judgment of the Court and there is no decree available for execution and therefore, the starting point of limitation in case of execution of a decree in partition suit is the date when the decree is engrossed on the requisite stamp papers as that would be the date when decree becomes enforceable. Hence the present appeal. |
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| 5 |
Shyamal Kumar Roy Vs. Sushil Kumar Agarwal |
Indian Stamp Act 1899 |
31/10/2006 |
Stamp Act, 1899:
Sections 36 and 38-Document admitted in evidence-Objection raised later regarding its admissibility-Permissibility of-Held: Not permissible-Party having consented to the document being marked as exhibit loses his right to reopen the question-West Bengal Amendment Act does not contain any contrary law-Indian Stamp (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1990-Section 33(4) and (5)-Evidence Act, 1882.
Parties entered into an agreement for development of suit property. Dispute arose between them. Respondent filed suit for declaration and permanent injunction. Trial Court passed interim order of injunction. High Court in revision set aside the order of injunction. Respondent thereafter filed suit for specific performance. During the hearing, respondent filed Development Agreement. The same was exhibited without any objection on the part of appellant. Two years later, the appellant filed an application for sending the said Agreement to the Collector for impounding in terms of Section 38 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. Trial Court dismissed the application, which was upheld by High Court.
In appeal to this Court, appellant contended that the Courts below had committed a manifest error in relying on Section 36 of the Indian Stamp Act, which cannot be said to have any application in the instant case, in view of the amendment made by the State of West Bengal therein, which came into force on 31.1.1994. |
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| 6 |
S.N. MATHUR Vs. BOARD OF REVENUE/C.C.R.A. & ORS. |
Indain Stamp Act 1899 |
18/02/2009 |
Indian Stamp Act, 1899:
Sections 2(24), 3, 5, 57 and Schedule I-B, Articles 58, 64 - Trust Deed -
Whether also answers the description of settlement deed and whether stamp
duty is payable under Article 58 of Schedule I-B - Held: High Court rightly
subjected the deed to stamp duty under Article 58 of Schedule I-B -
However, the case does not warrant levy of penalty equal to the deficit of
stamp duty.
Words & Phrases:
"Settlement", "deed of trust", "disposition" - Meaning of.
In view of the facts of the case and the contentions raised, the question
that arose for consideration in this appeal was whether the instrument in
question which answers the description of `Trust deed', will also answer
the description of "settlement deed", and if so whether stamp duty is
payable on the instrument, under Article 58 of Schedule I-B to the Indian
Stamp Act, 1899 as amended in U.P. |
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| 7 |
C.J. PAUL & ORS. Vs. DISTRICT COLLECTOR & ORS. |
Indian Stamp Act 1899 |
31/07/2009 |
Indian Stamp Act, 1899 - ss.47A and 19B - Proceedings under - Limitation
period - Interpretation and/or application of the provisions, as amended by
the State of Tamil Nadu - Discussed.
Interpretation of Statute - Strict construction - Penal statute - Held: A
statute of limitation conferring jurisdiction upon statutory authorities to
impose penalty must be construed strictly - A penal statute, unless
expressly provided, cannot be given retrospective effect.
In 1990, the appellants purchased some properties situated in the State of
Tamil Nadu by registered deeds of sale. The Sub-Registrar came to know of
the execution of the said sale deeds in 1996 and thereafter in 1998
initiated proceedings under Sections 47A(1) and 19B of the Indian Stamp
Act, 1899 for collection of deficit stamp duty in respect of the said
deeds.
Interpretation and/or application of the provisions of the Act as amended
by the State of Tamil Nadu was in question in the present appeal.
It was contended by the appellant that proceedings under Section 47A could
be initiated only within a period of two years from the date of
registration and since the same was initiated after more than eight years,
the same was barred by limitation. It was furthermore contended that
amendments to the Act subsequent to execution of the sale deeds in question
were not attracted to the facts of the present case. |
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| 8 |
SMT. SHANTY DEVIL. SINGH AND' ANR. Vs. TAX RECOVERY OFFICER AND ORS. |
Indian Stamp Act 1899 |
23/04/1990 |
Indian Stamp Act, 1899: Sections 3 and 29(f) and Sched-
ule 1, Article 18--Tax Recovery Sale--Certificate of
Sale--Whether purchaser of property liable to pay stamp
duty.
Registration Act, 1908: Sections 17(2)(xii) and
89(4)--Tax Recovery Sale--Purchaser of Property--Whether
required to get certificate of sale registered--Term "Reve-
nue Officer"--Whether includes Tax Recovery Officer.
Income Tax Act, 1961/Income Tax (Certificate Proceed-
ings) Rules, 1962: Rule 21--Tax Recovery Sale--Purchaser of
Property-Whether required to get certificate of sale regis-
tered. |
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| 9 |
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Vs. PRAMOD KUMAR GUPTA |
Indian Stamp Act 1899 |
17/12/1990 |
Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957: Section 147--Levy
of duty on transfer of immovable property--Expression 'i-
nstrument of sale of immovable property'--Scope of--Word
'instrument'--Whether has the same connotation as under the
Indian Stamp Act, 1899.
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Order XXI, Rules
92-94--Auction sale--Certificate of sale issued by Civil
Court--Whether instrument of sale--Whether chargeable to
duty under section 147 of the Municipal Corporation Act,
1957 --Object of the sale certificate explained.
Indian Stamp Act, 1899: Section 2 Clause (10) and
(14)'Conveyance' and 'instrument'--Meaning of. |
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| 10 |
BOARD OF REVENUE. U.P. Vs. M/S. ELECTRONIC INDUSTRIES OF INDIA |
Indian Stamp Act 1899 |
04/09/1995 |
U.P. Town Improvement Act, 1919(as amended by Local Self Government Laws
(Amendment) Act, 1966.
S.67-H(1)-Additional duty chargeable on deed of transfer of immovable
property-Nature of-Held: it is stamp duty under Stamp Act-Provisions of
ss.33, 40 and 48 Stamp Act can be invoked if increased duty leviable under
s.67-H(1) has not been paid.
Indian Stamp Act, 1899 :
Ss.3, 33, 40 48, 57-Stamp duty-Additional duty chargeable under s.67-H(1)
of U.P. Town Improvement Act Held is stamp duty-Whole of Stamp Act has been
made applicable to documents covered by S.67-H of U.P. Act.
The respondents mortgaged certain immovable properties executing a mortgage
deed in favour of the U.P. Financial Corporation. The authorities under the
Stamp Act found that in view of section 67-H(1) of the U.P. Act, the stamp
duty was deficient. The document was impounded under the provisions of the
Stamp Act. The respondents after paying the deficient duty under protest
made an application under Section 45 of the Stamp Act for refund. The
Revenue referred the following questions for opinion of the High Court
under section 57 of the Stamp Act:
(1) Whether an instrument of simple mortgage of immovable property
situated in an area to which the U.P. Town Improvement act was made
applicable was a deed of transfer of immovable property within the meaning
of section 67-H of the said Act? and
(2) Whether a public officer was barred from impounding a document
under section 33 and the Collector was barred from imposing any deficit
duty and penalty under section 40 and realising the same under section 48
of the Stamp Act on a deed of transfer of immovable property on which Stamp
duty as payable under the Stamp Act only was paid and the increased duty
under Section 67-H of the Town Improvement Act was not paid?
The High Court answered question No. 1 in the affirmative and in favour of
the Revenue. It, however, answered question No. 2 against the Revenue
holding that the duty leviable under section 67-H of the U.P. Act was in
the form of surcharge payable under the said Act over and above the stamp
duty; that the said duty was assessed independently of the stamp duty and
was not to be calculated in accordance with the manner provided in the
Stamp Act. Aggrieved, the Revenue filed the appeal. |
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| 11 |
SANTOSH JAYASWAL AND ANOTHER Vs. STATE OF M.P. AND OTHERS |
Indian Stamp Act 1899 |
11/09/1995 |
Indian Registration Act, 1908/Indian Stamp Act, 1899/M.P. General Clauses
Act, 1957/Transfer of Property Act, J882 :
Ss.l7(l)(c) and (d)ls.2(16), Schedule I, Article 35(a)/s.2(18)/s.3-
Immovable property-Grant of benefit arising out of-Right to catch fish-
Held, being a Profit arising out of immovable property is "immovable
property"-Is profit a prendre-Installment is compulsorily registrable under
Registration Act and required to be engrossed with necessary stamp duty
under Stamp Act.
The respondent-State Government granted to the appellants right to catch
fish in the tanks. On the requirement of registration of the instruments
under Indian Registration Act, 1908 and levy of stamp duty under Indian
Stamp Act, 1899, it was contended before the Division Bench of the High
Court that since the profit a prendre was not immovable property, the
instruments were not required to be registered. The High Court rejected the
claim. Aggrieved, the appellant filed the appeals by special leave.
It was contended on behalf of the appellants that right to catch fish was
in the nature of licence and as such the instruments were neither
compulsorily registrable under the Registration Act nor liable to stamp
duty under the Stamp Act. |
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| 12 |
STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. Vs. MOHABIR SINGH ETC. ETC. |
Indian Stamp Act 1899 |
21/11/1995 |
Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (as amended by the Punjab Stamp Act 1982):
S.47A-Document presented for registration-Duty of Registering Authority-
Guideline valuation-Instructions issued by Government-Effect of-Held; Not
consistent with sub-section (1) of S.47A-Open to State Govt. to revise its
guidelines and issue proper directions consistent with law.
In the main appeals, the respondents entered into an agreement of sale for
purchase of a portion of a house situated in Jallandhar of an extent of 20
marlas for a consideration valued at Rs. 7500 per marla. While the sale
deed was to be executed and registered, the Sub-registrar, based on the
Govt. instructions, opined that the prevailing market value was not less
than Rs. 15,000 per marla and on that basis he required the vendee to
revise the instrument and fix the consideration for the purpose of stamp
duty and registration charges on the revised valuation. Respondents filed
writ petition and the High Court held that the guidelines cannot control
the quasi-judicial discretion given to the Registering authority under
S.47(l) of the Indian Stamp Act 1899 as amended by Punjab Stamp Act, 1982.
Hence these appeals. |
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| 13 |
K.S. SHIVADEVAMMA AND ORS. ETC. Vs. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER AND LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER AND AN |
Indian Staamp Act 1899 |
08/12/1995 |
Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Sections 4(1) and 23(1) Indian Stamp Act, 1899-
Section 47A-Compensation-Determination of-Acquisition of Agricultural land
for building Bus Stand-Stamp Act and Commissioner's Assessment-Reliance for
determining market value-Determination by High Court after 53% deduction as
developmental charges-Held : Deduction of 53% under Building Rules and 33
1/3 under General Rules required-Stamp Act and Commissioner's assessment
cannot form the basis for determination of compensation-Hence, deduction
not illegal.
5 acres and 10 guntas of agricultural land abutting national Highway within
the limits of Municipality was acquired by a Notification under Section
4(1) for establishment of Bus Stand. Sanction for conversion of two acres
into non-agricultural land was obtained two years prior to the
Notification.
The Land Acquisition Officer awarded Rs. 5,000 per acre with the finding
that the lands are situated in developing area, though at the point of
time, the land was agricultural, it possessed potential value for building
purposes, but are not capable of immediately realising the price as
building sites, No steps were taken to have the non-agricultural lands
developed as building plots.
On reference, Civil Court determined the compensation @ 30,000 per acre. In
appeal to High Court the appellants placed the sale- deed which fetched
consideration of Rs. 41,000 and relied on Government circular determining
the value of the lands for the purpose of fixing stamp duty and
Registration fee and also placed commissioner's report regarding the
valuation assessed by him. The Court rejecting them, determined the
compensation Rs. 18 per Sq. yd. after deducting 53% as developmental
charges and concurred with the finding of the land acquisition officer.
In appeal to this court, the appellant contented that in MFA No. 670/71 for
expansion for Hospital, compensation of Rs 35 per Sq. yd. was awarded by
High Court and that in view of the situation of the land and having regard
to establishment of bus stand, compensation determined by High Court was
illegal. |
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| 13 |
VETERINARY COUNCIL OF INDIA Vs. INDIAN COUNCIL OF AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH |
Registration Act 1908 |
06/01/2000 |
Rent Control and Eviction:
Kerala Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965-Sections 2(6), (3) and
(I)-Relationship of-Landlord-Tenant-On the face of an unregistered lease
deed-Person inducted into possession of the building by the owner-Such
person paying monthly rent-Held, that despite an unregistered lease deed
was executed between the parties, there was a landlord tenant relationship
between them-Further, after commencement of Kerala Building (Lease and Rent
Control) Act, tenant became a statutory tenant and could be evicted only on
an application moved before the Rent Control Court-Transfer of Property
Act, 1882 sections 107 and 105- Registration Act, 1908 sections 17(1) and
49.
Words and Phrases: "Let"-Meaning of.
Appellant was inducted in possession of the building. It was as per an
unregistered tease-deed which was for a period of five years. Appellant
paid rent to the landlord and later to his successors-in-interest, the
respondents. Thereafter, the respondents filed suit for eviction against
the appellant The trial court decreed the suit In the first appeal it was
held that inspite of non-registration of the lease-deed there was a valid
tenancy and the appellant cannot be evicted. This order was set aside in
the second appeal ant the first appeal was remanded back. After remand the
district judge held that appellant is the tenant as defined in the Kerala
Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act and the respondents are not entitled
to a decree. The proper remedy would be to apply before the Rent Control
Court On the second appeal, High Court passed an eviction decree in favour
of the respondents. Hence, this appeal |
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| 14 |
ANTHONY Vs. KC ITTOOP AND SONS AND OTHERS |
Registration Act 1908 |
18/01/2000 |
Urban Development :
Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 :
Sections 39 and 38-B (inserted in 1993 w.e.f. 20-12- 1975)---Allotment of
land-By Development Authority-Bulk allotment of land made to registered
housing cooperative society for further allotment to its mem-bers-Validity
of-Held : In the absence of any averment to indicate that allotment of land
was denied to any society, organisation or person registered with the
Development Authority prior to the registration of the said society, such
allotment valid-Cooperative Societies.
Section 65-Government's power-To give direction to Development Authority-
Scope of-Held : Government has no power to issue direction contrary to the
provision of the Act or Rules framed under it-R. 14(2) (as it then stood)
did not permit sale of vacant site even with Development Authority's
permission, therefore Goverment cannot direct the Authority to permit such
sales-Hence, such sales invalid-However, with the insertion of R. 14(2)
such alienation can be regularised only under the circumstances provided by
R. 14(3).
Bangalore Development Authority (Allotment of Sites) Rules, 1984.
Rule 14(3)-Sale of sites-By allottees-Grounds for-Held : Not only the
insolvency of the allottee but also his inability to reside in the city and
their impecuniosity are also valid grounds. Allotment of land-Transfer of
sites-By allottees-Development Authority permitted transfer of sites by al-
lottees in contravention of Rules-Subsequently, Rules were amended permit-
ling such transfer subject to the purchases paying 25% of sital value as
determined by Government-Held : Development Authority directed to give an
opportunity to the purchasers to get the transfer regularised on payment of
25% of sital value.
Constitution of India, 1950 :
Article 226--Writ petition-Interference under-Scope of-Writ petition
challenged only out-of-turn allotment of sites to some members of Coopera-
tive Housing Society and the Transfers made by some allottees-However, High
Court not only held the bulk allotment of land to the society invalid but
also directed the Development Authority to constitute a committee to go
into all the allotments made by it-Correctness of-Held: High Court, by
issuing the impugned directions, travelled way beyond the scope of the writ
peti-tion-Hence, High Court not justified in issuing such directions.
The Legislator's Housing Cooperative Society was a registered society under
the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960. Bulk allot-ment of land was
made to the said Society by the appellant-Development Authority, which in
turn, allotted plots of land to its members. Respondent No. 1 filed a writ
petition before the High Court challenging not only the said allotment but
also the transfers of land by allottee in violation of Bangalore
Development Authority (Allotment of Sites) Rules, 1984, it was also averred
in the writ petition that out-of-turn allotment had been given to certain
persons.
The High Court held that the allotment of land was not validly made to the
Society. It also held that at that belated stage the violation com-mitted
would not render the allotment invalid. However, the High Court allowed the
writ petitions and directed that the appellant-Development Authority to
constitute a committee to go into all the allotments made by it.
On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the allotment was made to
the Society under Section 38-B of the Bangalore Development Authority, 1976
(which was inserted in the Act on 20.12.1975), and that the appellant had
permitted transfers of land pursuant to a direction issued by the State
Government under Section 65 of the Act. |
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| 15 |
CHIRANJILAL SRILAL GOENKA (DEAD), BY LRS. Vs. JASJIT SINGH & OTHERS |
Registration Act 1908 |
01/12/2000 |
Hindu Law :
Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956-Sections 12 and 13- Right of
disposal of property by the adoptive father by will-'Agreement to the
contrary'-Meaning of-Letter written by father of the adopted child to the
adoptive father-Letter making adoptive son sole inheritor of property.
Adoptive father and mother given absolute right during their lifetime-Held,
it is not an agreement to the contrary.
Registration Act, 1908-Section 17-Compulsory registration- Adoption of
child-Agreement restraining the adoptive father from disposing of the
property by will-Held, agreement is compulsorily registrable.
The appellant had filed a Writ Petition challenging the order of the Gold
Control Administrator confiscating gold under the Gold Control Orders. The
writ petition filed by the appellant was dismissed. The appellant preferred
an appeal before this court.
During the pendency of the appeal, the appellant died. His daughter and his
adopted son both claimed to be legal heirs of the deceased appellant The
daughter claimed on the basis of a will executed by the appellant in her
favour, whereas the adopted son claimed that he was adopted pursuant to a
letter dated 26.1.1961 written by his father to the appellant. The said
letter dated 26.1.1991 mentioned that the adopted son will inherit all the
moveable and immovable property of the appellant. The letter further
mentioned that during their lifetime, the appellant and his wife would have
absolute right to the property of the appellant. The letter was not signed
by the appellant.
This Court, by consent of parties, appointed an arbitrator to settle the
dispute as to who would be the legal heirs to the estate of the appellant.
The arbitrator made an award on 16.6.2000 holding that the will in favour
of the daughter was inoperative and that the adopted son was the sole heir
of the estate of the appellant as his adopted son. The son filed an
application before this Court to make the award of the arbitrator rule of
the Court and pass a decree in terms of the award. The daughter challenged
the award by filing her objections under Sections 30 and 33 of the
Arbitration Act, 1940. The objections raised by the daughter were :-
(i) that the letter dated 26.1.1961 cannot be considered to be an agreement
between the appellant and the father of the adopted son as there is nothing
to show that the offer made by the father of the adopted son was accepted
by the appellant.
(ii) that the letter dated 26.1.1961 does not restrict disposal of property
by transfer or by will; and
(iii) that if the letter is construed as limiting the right of the
appellant to bequeath the property by will, it would require registration
and as it was not registered, it was not admissible in evidence. |
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| 16 |
WESTERN PRESS PVT LTD., MUMBAI Vs. THE CUSTODIAN & ORS. |
Registration Act 1908 |
06/12/2000 |
Trial of offences relating to transactions in securities Act, 1992- Section
10-Appellant not a party in the proceedings before the court- Properties of
the appellant made liable for realisation of debts-Appellant gave an
undertaking that it will not alienate or encumber with the properties-
Further, chairman of the appellant company filed an affidavit of
undertaking- Held that the properties can be rightly attached for
realisation of the dues under the decree-Code of Civil Procedure 1908
section 145.
Registration Act, 1908-Section, 17(l)(b) and 17(2)(vi)-Documents of which
registration is compulsory-Consent decree and undertaking- Does not
envisage the execution of any deed or document to create or assign any
right title or interest in immovable property-Held, that consent decree and
undertaking does not require compulsory registration as it does not deal
with immoveable property.
Public money belonging to banks and financial institutions was siphoned out
into the accounts of respondent No. 5, which in turn siphoned to respondent
No. 6 and from them to respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4. Custodian filed petition
against the respondents and a decree was passed. Properties of the
appellant alongwith the properties of the respondents was to be attached
for realisation of the dues under the decree. Appellant gave an undertaking
to the court that on sale in execution, they shall hand over the possession
of the premises. An affidavit of undertaking was also filed by the Chairman
of the appellant company. Since there was a default, the custodian filed an
application by way of execution proceedings against the respondents.
Special Court appointed a receiver to take possession and to dispose of the
properties by sale. Apprehending similar course of action, appellant filed
an application pleading that the properties cannot proceeded against for
realisation of debts. Application was dismissed. Hence, this appeal. |
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| 17 |
COMMISSIONS OF INCOME TAX, JAIPUR Vs. SIKBHMAL NAWALAKHA |
Registration Act 1908 |
16/08/2001 |
Gift Tax Act, 1958: Sections 2(xii), 4(1) (c) and (d)-Gift of immovable
property by unregistered document-Held, for a valid gift under Section 2
(xii) and (4) compliance with the provisions of Transfer of property Act
and Registration Act necessarv- transfer of Properly Act, 1882-Sections 122
and 123-Registration Act, 1908- Sections 17.
Words & Phrases .
"Gift"-Meaning of in the context of Section 2(xii) of Gift Tax Act, 1958
and Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
Respondent, by an unregistered declaration sought to make a gift of certain
immovable property to his wife. The Gift Tax Officer held that no valid
gift had been made by respondent since the provisions of Section 123 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 had not been complied with. The said
Findings were affirmed by the Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal.
However, on reference, the High Court observed that the definition of the
word 'gift' under the Gift Tux Act, 1958 was wider than the definition of
'gift' in the Transfer of Property Act, and held that registration of
document was not necessary for a valid gilt under Section 4 of the Act.
Hence the present appeal by Revenue. |
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| 18 |
GURBAX SINGH Vs. KARTAR SINGH AND ORS. |
Registration Act 1908 |
11/02/2002 |
Registration Act, 1908
S.47-Sale deeds-Commencement of operation-Two sale deeds (Ext. P-2 and Ext.
D-1) executed the same day-Time of execution of P-2 shown as 10.00 A.M.-
Time of execution of D-l not shown-Concurrent findings of courts below that
Ext. P-2 executed earlier than Ext. D-2 and former prevails over latter- |
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| 19 |
N. Khadervali Saheb (Dead) by LRs. and Anr. Vs. N. Gudu Sahib(Dead) and Ors. |
Registration Act 1908 |
05/02/2003 |
Registration Act, 1908-Section 17-Award distributing assets on dissolution
of partnership-Registration of award-Requirement for -Held, award does not
require registration, since the award does not transfer or assign interest
in any asset.
On dissolution of a partnership firm, the assets were allotted between the
partners by way of an arbitration award. The question for consideration in
these cases was whether such an award amounts to creation of or transfer of
any fresh rights in movable or immovable properties so as to bring it
within the ambit of Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908. |
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| 20 |
BHAGAT RAM AND ANR. Vs. SURESH AND ORS. |
Registration Act 1908 |
25/11/2003 |
Indian Succession Act, 1925-Sections2 (b), 2(h), 63, 64 & 70/Indian
Evidence Act, 1872-Sections 68 & 114-Will executed by testator attested by
two witnesses-Codicil, which is inconsistent with the Will, recorded and
signed by testator in presence of Reigstrar of Deeds and attested by one
witness only-Registrar of Deeds signing the codicil-Proof of execution of
codicil-Held, Codicil is required to be executed and proved as will- On
facts, attesting witness and Registrar of Deeds were not examined in
witness box and hence the codicil not proved-Indian Registration Act, 1908;
Sections 52 & 58.
Appellants are the sons of late M. Respondent No. 3 is the widow of M.M.
executed a Will in favour of respondent No. 3 appointing her to be the sole
heir and successor to the suit property. It was attested by two witnesses.
The Will was presented for registration. Registrar of Deeds read out the
contents of the Will to the executant. M made an oral statement to the
Registrar which is in departure from the contents of the Will. The
statement was recorded and was signed by M and attested by the one witness.
The Registrar of Deeds has put his signature below the endorsement which
incorporates the statement made by M. Thereafter, the Will was registered.
After the death of M, respondent No. 3 got her name mutated over the suit
property and transferred it by a registered Deed of Sale in favour of
respondent Nos. l and 2. The appellants filed a suit for declaration for
title and for issuance of preventive injunction by way of consequential
relief against respondent Nos. l and 2. The appellants contended before the
trial court that the Will has to be read alongwith the statement made by M.
and recorded by the Registrar of Deeds; that the two formed part of one
document and hence, respondent No. 3, who succeeded only to a life estate
without any right to alienation, could no sell the suit property to
respondents l and 2. The suit of the appellants was dismissed by the trial
court. The decree of the trial court has been upheld by first appellate
court and High Court.
In appeal, the appellants contended that the statement by M recorded by the
Registrar of Deeds and attested by one witness amounts to a codicil; that
the Will and the codicil formed part of one document; that the codicil has
to be given effect to as duly executed since it is registered along with
the Will; that the codicil does not require attestation by two witnesses;
that the codicil need not be executed and proved under Indian Succession
Act, 1925 and Indian Evidence Act, 1872 like a Will; that the signature of
the Registrar of Deeds can be taken to be attestation by a second witness;
that there is nothing in law to debar a Registrar of Deeds from acting as
an attesting witness; that the Registrar can act in personal capacity as
attesting witness while registering the document in official capacity. |
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| 21 |
N. Khosla Vs. Rajlakshmi (dead) & Ors. |
registration Act 1908 |
06/03/2006 |
Registration Act, 1908-Section 17(1) (b)-Arbitration Act, 1940; Section 14-Gift of part of ancestral immoveable property to daughters by father-Father later revoked the gift deed and paid cash to them in lieu of the property-Father partitioned the property among his sons-Dispute between sons daughters regarding share of the property-Sole Arbitrator held in favour of the sons-Sons filed an application before trial court to make the award of the arbitrator, a Rule of the Court-Daughters raised objections on the ground that it was not registered under the Registration Act-Trial Court dismissed the application filed by the sons-Appellate Court and High Court also held against the sons-Correctness of-Held, on facts, the award of the Arbitrator only declares the pre-existing right and does not create any right in praesenti or in future-Hence, the award does not require registration and should be made a Rule of the Court-Abatement of appeal as against deceased respondent would not abate the appeal qua surviving respondents as the daughters had distinct shares by metes and bounds.
One D had two sons and three daughters. D had an ancestral property. D gifted three plots of land out of his ancestral property to his daughters. Since none of the daughters took possession of the plots, D revoked the gift deed and resumed the plots by paying cash to each of them in lieu of it. Thereafter, D partitioned the entire ancestral property to his two sons. After the death of D, a dispute arose between the sons and daughters regarding the gift deed and resumption of the gifted property. The daughters got mutation of the gifted plots in revenue records in their names. The dispute was referred to a sole Arbitrator. The Arbitrator in his award held that the daughters are not entitled to the plots in the ancestral property since D revoked the gift deed and resumed the plots by paying cash with their consent. The Arbitrator further held that the mutation of the plots by the daughters in their favour was obtained by fraud and therefore, non-est.
Petitioner-sons filed an application before trial court under Section 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 to make the award of the Arbitrator, a Rule of the Court. Respondent-daughters filed objections, inter alia, contending that the award could not be made a Rule of the Court since it was not registered under Section 17(1) (b) of the Registration Act, 1908. The trial court dismissed the application of the appellants. Appellate Court and High Court also held in favour of the respondents. Hence the appeal before this Court. During the pendency of the appeal, one of the respondents died and an application, filed for substitution of her legal representatives by the appellant, was dismissed by this Court on ground of delay.
The appellant contended that the dismissal of the application for substitution of legal heirs of deceased respondent would not abate the appeal as against surviving respondents-daughters since the gift deed was distinct and separate and is executable on them; and that the award of the Arbitrator does not create any right or extinguish any right in praesenti or in future requiring registration under section 17(1) (b) of the Registration Act, 1908 and hence should be made a Rule of the Court.
The respondents contended that the appeal as against surviving respondents also gets abated since the issue is common to all of them; and that the award of the Arbitrator created rights in favour of the sons by extinguishing their rights in the immoveable property requiring registration and hence the award cannot be made a Rule of the Court. |
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| 22 |
A. Jitendernath Vs. Jubilee Hills Coop. House Bld. Soc. & Anr. |
registration Act 1908 |
02/05/2006 |
Constitution of India-Article 142-Registration Act, 1908-Section 47-Provisional allotment of a plot of land made to a member by Cooperative Society-On non-payment of development charges within stipulated time, Society allotted the plot to another member-Original allottee seeking allotment of an alternative plot refused by the Society-Original allottee filed an application before Registrar, without impleading the subsequent allottee, for allotment of the original plot or an alternative plot-Registrar passed an award directing the Society to allot the original plot to the original allottee-Society registered the original plot in favour of subsequent allottee-Suit filed by subsequent allottee against Society, without impleading original allottee, for transfer of membership-Trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the subsequent allottee-Execution petition filed by purchaser from subsequent allottee before trial court-Original allottee also filed execution petition for execution of the award of the Registrar-Trial Court dismissed the execution petition of the original allottee-Appeal by original allottee before Appellate Court was allowed-High Court allowed the Revision filed by subsequent allottee holding that on registration of the sale deed, the right, title and interest shall pass on to the purchaser from the date of execution and not from the date of registration-Correctness of-Held, in law, right, title or interest in property shall pass on with retrospective effect i.e. from the date of execution and not from the date of registration-Provisional allottee does not get a legal right for allotment of the plot-Award passed without impleading a necessary party is violation of principles of natural justice and is a nullity and hence the principle of res judicata will not apply-Courts cannot pass an order directing the Society to allot an alternative plot by causing injustice to others-Hence, the Society is directed to refund the money to original allottee with 24% interest-Society also directed to pay compensation to original allottee and purchaser from subsequent allottee for making false representation before the Court.
Father of one S and the mother of the appellant were members of first-respondent Society. The mother of the appellant died and it was not notified to the Society. The Society made a provisional allotment of a plot of land in favour of the mother of the appellant subject to payment of development charges within a stipulated date. The Society cancelled the provisional allotment since the payment was not made even after granting an extension of time. The Society allotted the plot in favour of S. The appellant thereafter communicated to the Society intimating the death of his mother and sought membership of the Society by way of transfer. The appellant requested the Society to allot alternative plot of land to him since the original plot was given to S. The Society executed a Sale Deed in favour of S for the original plot given and presented it for registration. The Society admitted the appellant as a member of the Society but declined to make allotment of plot to the appellant.
The appellant filed an application before Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Society to declare that he is entitled to allotment or original plot or allot an alternative plot. The appellant did not implead S as a party. The Society, in response to the notice of the Registrar, stated that the original plot was allotted to S and he had already constructed a house on it. On personal inspection of the site, when the Registrar found that no house was constructed on the original plot, he made an award in favour of the appellant directing the Society to allot the original plot. Pursuant to the award, the appellant paid all the amounts payable. Despite the award, the Society registered the original plot in favour of S.
The Society field an appeal before Cooperative Tribunal challenging the award. S filed a suit against the Society before trial court since the transfer of membership was not intimated to him. S did not implead the appellant in the suit. During pendency of the suit, S transferred his right, title and interest in favour of second respondent who filed an application in the suit before the trial court and in the appeal before Cooperative Tribunal for being impleaded as a party. The trial decreed the suit in favour of the second respondent. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal of the Society for default. The second respondent filed a Revision application before High Court against the order of the Tribunal which was dismissed with a liberty reserved to the second respondent to come on record as an additional respondent if the appeal is restored.
The second respondent filed an Execution petition for executing the decree before the trial court. The appellant also filed an Execution petition before the trial court for executing the award of the Registrar. The trial court allowed the Execution petition of the second respondent and dismissed the execution petition of the appellant. The appellant filed an appeal before Appellate Court. The Appellate Court allowed the appeal on the ground that no valid title passed on to S as the sale deed in his favour was registered only after passing the award by the Registrar. The Second respondent filed a Revision Application before the High Court. The High Court allowed the Revision application on the ground that on the date of the award of the Registrar, the sale deed was pending for registration and once it was registered, it dates back to the date of presentation of the document which was earlier to the date of the award. The High Court clarified that the appellant cannot seek allotment of alternative plot and not the original plot which was found to be validity transferred.
In appeal this Court in order to do justice, asked the Society whether any plot was available for allotment to the appellant. The Society informed the Court that there was one alternative plot which could be allotted to the appellant. The appellant accepted the offer and on payment of necessary amount, the Society issued an allotment letter in favour of the appellant. Several interlocutory applications then came to be filed before this Court contending that the alternative plot offered to the appellant had already been allotted to them by the Society.
The appellant contended that under section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908 the registration of the sale deed takes effect only from the date of registration and not from the date of presentation of sale deed for registration; that he became eligible for the original plot after he was admitted as a member of the Society in place of his deceased mother; that the original plot, which was allotted to his mother, could not have been allotted to S by the Society; that the Registrar should have cancelled the allotment made in favour of S and allotted the same to the appellant; that on dismissal of the appeal by the Cooperative Tribunal, the award passed by the Registrar has attained finality; that he was not impleaded as a party to the suit filed by S before the trial court and hence the decree passed in favour of the second respondent is not binding on him; that the principle of res judicata is attracted and hence the respondents cannot question the correctness or otherwise of the award which was made prior to the registration of the deed of sale; that since an alternative plot was allotted to him, the Society must be held to have recognised the right of the appellant for allotment of plot in his capacity and hence the Society must be directed to formalise the allotment of the alternative plot by execution and registration of a sale deed in his favour.
The Society contended that when the purported allotment of plot was made in favour of the appellant, an Administrator was incharge of the Society; and that when the affairs of the Society was taken over by the elected body, it has found out that there were several persons in whose favour directions have been issued.
The second respondent contended that the original allotment made in favour of the mother of the appellant must be deemed to have been cancelled by the Society as the requisite payments were not made to the Society. |
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| 23 |
SOM DEV & ORS. Vs. RATI RAM & ANR. |
Registration Act 1908 |
06/09/2006 |
Indian Registration Act, 1908:
Section 17-Decree in a civil suit-Recognition of preexisting rights in property based on admission of the defendant-Non registration of-Enforceability-Held, on facts, if based on admission and in nature of a family settlement does not require registration and hence enforceable.
The issue involved in the present appeal is-Weather a decree passed on admission of relinquishment of right by one of the co sharer of the property in a suit relating to family arrangement requires registration under Section 17(1) of the Registration Act and consequently, whether such decree can entitle the decree holder to enforce a right of pre-emption and recover possession of the property from the assignee of the other co-owner? The contention germane to this appeal that was raised by the contesting defendants was that a right was created in the present plaintiff by the decree in the earlier Civil Suit which was one based on a compromise and since the decree purported to create a right in the plaintiff in a property in which he had no pre-existing right, the compromise decree required registration in terms of Section 17(1) of the Registration Act and the decree not having been registered, the plaintiff was not entitled to enforce the alleged right of pre-emption as against the contesting defendants or their assignor, the other co-owner. The trial court held that the decree in the earlier suit was enforceable even without registration as it was not hit by Section 17(1) of the Registration Act. On appeal, the lower appellate court affirmed this view of the trial court. The lower appellate court also held that what was involved in earlier Civil suit was a family arrangement and since a bona fide family arrangement among the members of a family in the large sense of the term, did not require registration, no objection could be raised by the contesting defendants to the enforceability of the title claimed by the plaintiff. In the second appeal, the High Court held that the decree in earlier civil Suit was based on a family settlement which did not require registration and that the decree itself did not require registration in view of Section 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act. Hence the present appeal. |
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| 24 |
Benga Behera & Anr Vs. Braja Kishore Nanda & Ors |
Registration act 1908 |
15/05/2007 |
WILL:
Testatrix executed Will in favour of respondent who was stranger to family-Genuineness of Will challenged by legal heirs-Held: No independent witness examined to show how testatrix came close to respondent-No explanation given as to why valuable agricultural land along with house had been gifted to respondent-Original Will has not been produced-Burden-on respondent was heavy, he being a stranger to the family which he failed to discharge-Trial Judge as also High Court did not take into consideration effect of contradictions and inconsistencies in statement of witnesses and interpolation/variance in the Xerox copy of the Will vis-a-vis certified copy thereof-Non-production of original Will stating that Will got lost, gives rise to inference that Will did not contain thumb impression of testatrix-Testatrix was an old and ill lady and had no independent adviser in matter of execution of Will while respondent and his father being disciple of her Guru were in a position to dominate her mental process-Existence of suspicious circumstances itself sufficient to arrive at a conclusion that genuineness of Will has not duly been proved-Succession Act, 1925-s.63.
Will-Loss of-Proof of-Held: It is obligatory on part of beneficiary to establish loss of Will, beyond all reasonable doubt-Beneficiary did not say how the Will was lost-No FIR was lodged about missing of document before any authority-Even approximate point of time the Will was lost, was not stated-Loss of the original Will was, thus, not satisfactorily proved-Evidence Act, 1872-s. 65(c).
Will-Attestation of-Requirement of-Held: Proof of execution of a Will has to be attested at least by two witnesses-At least one attesting witness has to be examined to prove execution and attestation of the Will-Further, it is to be proved that the executant had signed and/or given his thumb impression in presence of at least two attesting witnesses and the attesting witnesses had put their signatures in presence of the executant.
Registration Act, 1908: s.52-Signature of every person presenting a document for registration is required to be endorsed on every such document at the time of presentation-If an authority in performance of a statutory duty signs a document, he does not become an attesting witness within the meaning of s.3 of Transfer of Property Act and s. 63 of Succession Act-"Animus attestandi" is a necessary ingredient for proving attestation.
One 'S' is the owner of the property in question. She was 70 years old and living in a math. She executed will in favour of respondent no. 1. The respondent no.1 was complete stranger to the family. On the same day, a sale deed was also executed by 'S' in favour of advocate PW-7. The will was scribed by PW-9, an advocate's clerk. PW-9 and one 'C' were the attesting witness 'S' expired in 1983. In 1986, first respondent applied for grant of letters of administration in respect of alleged will. Appellants are the heirs and legal representatives of the testatrix. They contested the said application, questioning execution of the Will alleging the same to be a forged and a sham document. Execution of the will was sought to be proved by producing a certified copy thereof. A purported xeroxed copy of the said will was also filed. Courts below held in favour of respondent no. 1. Hence the present appeal. |
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| 25 |
Hardesh Ores Pvt. Ltd Vs. M/s. Hede and Company |
Registration Act 1908 |
15/05/2007 |
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Order II Rule 2; Order VII Rule 11(d)-Limitation Act, 1963 : Articles 54, 58 & 113-Agreements entered into by lessee with lessor for extraction of ore during lease period-Exercise of option of renewal of lease by the lessee was rejected by the lessor-Suit for perpetual injunction filed by the lessee before trial court to restrain the lessor from carrying on the work of extraction by asserting its exclusive right under the renewed agreement-Lessor filing an application before the trial court contending that the suit is for specific performance of the lease which is barred by limitation-Trial Court allowed the application and dismissed the suit-High Court upholding the judgment of the trial court-Correctness of-Held, renewal of a lease requires execution of a document in accordance with law evidencing renewal and there is no concept of automatic renewal of lease by mere exercise of option by the lessee-On facts, the prayer for relief of perpetual injunction cannot be granted on the ground that there is no subsisting agreement evidenced by a written document or by a declaration of a Court-Hence, the suit is barred by limitation-Registration Act, 1908: Sections 17 & 49.
Appellants entered into separate agreements with respondent-company for extraction of ore from mine and purchase of minerals extracted from the mine respectively. The agreement provided that the appellant has the sole option to renew the agreements during the period of lease and renewals thereafter on the same terms and conditions contained in the original agreement; that the respondent shall not in any manner interfere or obstruct the appellant from carrying on its work; and that during the subsistence of the agreement, the appellant has the sole right to extract or and the respondent is not entitled to authorize ore permit any other person for that purpose and that the respondent shall not enter into any agreement with any other party for the same work.
The appellants exercised its option to renew the agreement under the original agreement and conveyed its decision to the respondent. The respondent replied that the appellants are not entitled to exercise the option for renewal. When the appellant came to know that the respondent was conducting extraction in the land of surface right owners, the appellant issued a notice to the respondent to resist from doing any extraction or selling ore by asserting its exclusive right under the agreement. The appellants filed suits before trial court for perpetual injunction seeking enforcement of the negative covenants under the agreement. The respondent filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC submitting that the suits filed by the appellants are for specific performance of the contract and they are barred by limitation under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Trial court allowed the application and dismissed the suits as barred by limitation. The appeals preferred before High Court were also dismissed.
In appeal to this Court, the appellants contended that the suit is for perpetual injunction seeking enforcement of the negative covenants of the Extraction Agreement and not a suit for specific performance, that the plaint must be read as a whole to determine the nature of the suit; that the Agreement provides for automatic renewal of the lease once the option is exercised by the appellant; and that Article 113 and not Article 54 of the Limitation Act is applicable in the case.
The respondent contended that the trial court and the High Court were right in holding that it is a suit for specific performance and not a mere suit for perpetual injunction; that the renewal of a mining lease must be evidenced by the execution of a deed incorporating the negative covenants; that there is no automatic renewal of lease by mere exercise of option by the appellant; that the appellant cannot seek a relief by way of injunction by filing a suit for enforcement of negative covenants without getting first a renewed lease deed executed or getting a declaration from a Court of law; and that Article 54 of the Limitation Act is applicable in the case and not Articles 58 and 113 of the Limitation Act. |
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| 26 |
Municipal Committee, Patiala Vs. Model Town Residents Asson. & Ors |
Registration Act 1908 |
01/08/2007 |
Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 as amended by Act 11 of 1994; Ss. 3(1), 3(8aa) and 68/Land Acquisition Act, 1894; S.23/Registration Act, 1908/Constitution of India, 1950; Articles 14 and 226:
Levy of house-tax-Amendment made in Section 3 of the Act-As per amended provisions, house-tax leviable at different rates on the same property when used by the owner and the tenant and market value of the property could be determined without providing any guidelines-Amended provisions of Law-Constitutionality of-Held: `Rate' in the context of levy of house-tax means a tax on annual value/rateable value of land/building-Prior to amendment, the tenanted as well as self-occupied premises equated in the matter of determination of gross annual rent-However, in case it was not possible for the Municipality to determine the gross annual rent in terms of the provisions of law, it could fix the annual value in terms of certain formula-Legislature has given a great amount of leeway in the matter of taxation-Article 14 of the Constitution does not prohibit classification-Classification made between premises occupied by the tenants on one hand and those occupied by the owner himself on the other is wholly reasonable and has direct nexus with the object sought to be achieved-Hence, the High Court erred in holding that Section 3(1)(b) of the Act making an invidious discrimination between premises in occupation of the tenant and which are self-occupied-Besides as per amended provision u/s.3(8aa), a formula has been evolved to assess house-tax on self-occupied premises whereby tax on annual value could be calculated on the basis of market value of the land taking into account cost of construction and deducting the depreciation-While calculating the market value of the land, Assessing Officer will keep in view the principles mentioned in the Land Acquisition Act-Hence, the High Court erred in striking down Section 3(8aa) on the ground of absence of guidelines in the amended provisions in determining the market value of the land.
Legislative power to enact validation law making them effective retrospectively-Power of Judicial Review-Exercise of-Held: It is not open to the High Court to exercise such powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, particularly in the matter of taxation-Constitution of India, 1950-Article 226.
The question which arose for determination in these appeals was as to whether the High Court was right in holding, Section 3(1)(b) of the Punjab Municipal Act as amended by Act 11 of 1994, whereby the same property is subjected to house-tax at different rates when it is occupied by a tenant and landlord and also Section 3(8aa) as amended defining "market value" for the purpose of levying house tax without indicating any guidelines for its determination, as unconstitutional since it suffers from the vice of discrimination.
Appellant-Municipal Committee contended that Section 3(1)(b) of the Punjab Municipal Act, as amended, makes no distinction between self occupied land or building and tenanted land or building; that as per amended provision, annual value of the property in occupation of the tenant has to be determined on the basis of actual rent which that property would fetch whereas if the same property if it is in occupation of its owner then the rateable value under the amended provisions shall be calculated in accordance with Section 3(1)(b) of the Act; that in the case of commercial property, it is the tax on the scarce resources, mainly the land whose prices are escalating, which provides an intelligible differentia having requisite connection with the object sought to be achieved; that there cannot be a straight-jacket formula for determination of the annual value; and that the State is always entitled to raise its resources by way of imposition of tax.
Respondent-assessee contended that there is no rational basis for making the classification as introduced in Section 3(1)(b) by way of the amendment, particularly when both the premises, whether let out or self occupied, are subject to rent restrictions under the Act. |
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| 27 |
Municipal Committee, Patiala Vs. Model Town Residents Asson. & Ors |
Registration Act 1908 |
01/08/2007 |
Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 as amended by Act 11 of 1994; Ss. 3(1), 3(8aa) and 68/Land Acquisition Act, 1894; S.23/Registration Act, 1908/Constitution of India, 1950; Articles 14 and 226:
Levy of house-tax-Amendment made in Section 3 of the Act-As per amended provisions, house-tax leviable at different rates on the same property when used by the owner and the tenant and market value of the property could be determined without providing any guidelines-Amended provisions of Law-Constitutionality of-Held: `Rate' in the context of levy of house-tax means a tax on annual value/rateable value of land/building-Prior to amendment, the tenanted as well as self-occupied premises equated in the matter of determination of gross annual rent-However, in case it was not possible for the Municipality to determine the gross annual rent in terms of the provisions of law, it could fix the annual value in terms of certain formula-Legislature has given a great amount of leeway in the matter of taxation-Article 14 of the Constitution does not prohibit classification-Classification made between premises occupied by the tenants on one hand and those occupied by the owner himself on the other is wholly reasonable and has direct nexus with the object sought to be achieved-Hence, the High Court erred in holding that Section 3(1)(b) of the Act making an invidious discrimination between premises in occupation of the tenant and which are self-occupied-Besides as per amended provision u/s.3(8aa), a formula has been evolved to assess house-tax on self-occupied premises whereby tax on annual value could be calculated on the basis of market value of the land taking into account cost of construction and deducting the depreciation-While calculating the market value of the land, Assessing Officer will keep in view the principles mentioned in the Land Acquisition Act-Hence, the High Court erred in striking down Section 3(8aa) on the ground of absence of guidelines in the amended provisions in determining the market value of the land.
Legislative power to enact validation law making them effective retrospectively-Power of Judicial Review-Exercise of-Held: It is not open to the High Court to exercise such powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, particularly in the matter of taxation-Constitution of India, 1950-Article 226.
The question which arose for determination in these appeals was as to whether the High Court was right in holding, Section 3(1)(b) of the Punjab Municipal Act as amended by Act 11 of 1994, whereby the same property is subjected to house-tax at different rates when it is occupied by a tenant and landlord and also Section 3(8aa) as amended defining "market value" for the purpose of levying house tax without indicating any guidelines for its determination, as unconstitutional since it suffers from the vice of discrimination.
Appellant-Municipal Committee contended that Section 3(1)(b) of the Punjab Municipal Act, as amended, makes no distinction between self occupied land or building and tenanted land or building; that as per amended provision, annual value of the property in occupation of the tenant has to be determined on the basis of actual rent which that property would fetch whereas if the same property if it is in occupation of its owner then the rateable value under the amended provisions shall be calculated in accordance with Section 3(1)(b) of the Act; that in the case of commercial property, it is the tax on the scarce resources, mainly the land whose prices are escalating, which provides an intelligible differentia having requisite connection with the object sought to be achieved; that there cannot be a straight-jacket formula for determination of the annual value; and that the State is always entitled to raise its resources by way of imposition of tax.
Respondent-assessee contended that there is no rational basis for making the classification as introduced in Section 3(1)(b) by way of the amendment, particularly when both the premises, whether let out or self occupied, are subject to rent restrictions under the Act. |
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| 28 |
M/S K.B.SAHA AND SONS PVT. LTD Vs. M/S DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANT LTD |
Registration Act 1908 |
12/05/2008,/td>
| West Bengal Premises/Tenancy Act, 1956:
s. 13(1b) - Protection to tenant - Change of user - Premises let out to a company for residence of its named officer - Company intending to allot the premises to some other employee - Suit by landlord for ejectment on the ground of violation of s.108(o) of Transfer of Property Act - HELD: Lease agreement having not been registered, the same is inadmissible in evidence -Proviso to s.49 of Registration Act is not applicable as use of the document to prov violation of s.108(o) of Transfer of Property Act is not a `collateral purpose' - Even otherwise, if company allotted the premises for residence of any employee other than the named one, it would not be `change of user' - For a decree of eviction under the Act, landlord has to plead and prove one of the grounds mentioned in s.13 of the Act - On facts, appellant is not entitled to a decree of eviction under the Act - Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - ss. 107 and 108 - Registration Act, 1908 - s.49, proviso.
Transfer of Property Act, 1882:
ss. 107 - Lease agreement letting out the premises for residence on monthly rental - Not registered - Admissibility of in evidence - `Change of user' - Connotation of - Registration Act, 1908 - s.49, proviso - Deeds and documents.
Words and Phrases:
Expressions `collateral purpose' and `change of user' - Connotation of in the context of s.108 of Transfer of Property Act and s. 49 of Registration Act.
The suit premises were let out by the appellant-plaintiff to the respondent-company for residence of its particular officer, namely, `KD' on a monthly rent. According to the plaintiff the agreement dated 30.3.1976 provided that if the respondent intended to use the premises for any purpose other than providing residential accommodation to `KD', it would have to seek a written permission therefor from the appellant. By a letter dated 6.3.1992, the respondent informed the appellant that `KD' had vacated the suit premises and that it wanted to make repairs and to allot the same to another employee. The appellant replied asking the respondent to surrender the premises, but to no avail. Therefore, the appellant filed Title Suit No. 19/92 for declaration and permanent injunction that in terms of the agreement dated 30.3.1976 the respondent had no right to allot the suit premises to any other employee after the same was vacated by `KD'. The trial court passed an interim injunction. On 18.3.1995 a notice was served upon the respondent to vacate the suit premises and on its non-compliance, Title Suit No. 39/95 was filed for ejectment of the respondent. The case of the respondent was that the suit premises were let out to it and not to its officer and even after the said officer vacating the same, tenancy of the respondent continued and the same was protected by the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. The suits were dismissed by the trial court and so also the appeals by the High Court.
In the instant appeals filed by the plaintiff-landlord, it was contended for the appellant that the lease agreement creating tenancy from month to month was not compulsorily registrable u/s 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and, as such, the prohibition contained in s.49 of the Registration Act, 1908 was not applicable ; therefore, trial court erred in holding that the lease agreement being an unregistered document could not be used to establish the provisions made therein that the premises were let out for occupation of the named officer of the respondent and for no other purposes. In the alternative it was contended that the purpose of letting as specified in the lease agreement was a `collateral purpose' and, therefore, the document could be looked into under the proviso to s.49 of the Registration Act. It was submitted that the respondent had violated s.108(o) of the Transfer of Property Act and, accordingly was liable to be evicted u/s 13(1b) of the Act.
None appeared for the respondent despite best efforts of the Court. However, the Court was informed that pursuant to interim order of the courts below, respondent kept the suit premises vacant under its lock and key. |
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| 29 |
NAREN CHANDRA NASKAR Vs. ARUN BHATTACHARYA & ORS. |
Registration Act 1908 |
24/09/2008 |
Deeds and Documents: Genuineness of Sale Deed - Registration of two Sale Deeds in respect of different properties - Both the Vendees claiming to be in peaceful possession of their respective properties - Registration details of both Deeds identical - Initiation of criminal case against one of the vendees (appellant) at the instance of District Registrar - Another vendee (respondent) filing writ petition alleging forgery - Division Bench of High Court directing to hold enquiry as to genuineness of both the Sale Deeds - The District Registrar holding enquiry only in respect of Deed of the respondent and holding it genuine - On appeal, held: Direction by High court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to hold enquiry cannot be questioned - However, enquiry by the officer at whose instance criminal proceedings were initiated is not correct - Examination of genuineness of the document of appellant as well as respondent was required - Finding as to genuineness of document of respondent is confirmed - Direction to Inspector General of Registration to conduct a separate enquiry as to ascertain genuineness of appellant's document - If found genuine, mistake in numbering the documents be rectified - Otherwise action to be taken accordingly - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 226 - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - O. 23 r. 1 - Registration Act, 1908 - Enquiry into genuineness of Sale Deed - Administrative Law - Bias.
Two Sale Deeds in respect of two different plots of land were registered respectively by appellant as well as respondent No. 1. However, both the Sale Deeds were having identical registration details. Both appellant as well as respondent No. 1 stated to be in undisturbed possession of their respective lands. A criminal case u/s 471/420 IPC against the appellant was initiated at the instance of District Registrar in view of the above and because the sale Deed of respondent No. 1 was not traceable in the records of the office.
Respondent No. 1 also filed a writ petition alleging that the Deed of the appellant was forged. He sought direction to the authorities concerned to remove the Deed of the appellant from the records and restore its Deed in its place and to proceed against the culprits in accordance with law. Single Judge of High Court disposed of the same holding that since investigation in the case was on, no further order was required. In intra-court appeal, Division Bench of High Court directed the District Registrar to conduct an enquiry as to genuineness of the respective documents of the appellant and respondent No. 1. Consequently, on holding of enquiry, document of respondent No. 1 was found genuine.
In appeal to this Court, the appellant contended that in absence of power under Registration Act to the Officer concerned, he could not have conducted the enquiry; that since the suit filed on behalf of daughter of appellant's vendor against him claiming title of the property in question was dismissed, no futher direction could have been given by the writ court to conduct enquiry into the genuineness of appellant's Deed; that the District Registrar was required to consider genuineness of the documents of both the appellant as well as respondent No. 1; and that inquiry by the officer, who made a complaint against the appellant was prejudiced. |
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| 30 |
AVINASH KUMAR CHAUHAN Vs. VIJAY KRISHNA MISHRA |
Registration Act 1908 |
17/12/2008 |
Stamp Act, 1899 - ss. 33 and 35 and Article 23 of Schedule 1A (as
substituted by M.P. Act No. 19 of 1989) -- Execution of sale deed -
Execution whereof statutorily barred - Suit by the vendee for recovery of
consideration amount - Reliance on the conveyance deed which was not
registered - Document impounded, being not duly stamped - Held: Provision
of ss. 33 and 35 are applicable, even if the unregistered document sought
to be admitted in evidence is for collateral purpose - The purpose for
which reliance is placed on the document is not relevant for applicability
of the provisions - s. 35 rules out applicability of s. 49 of Registration
Act - On facts, the document rightly impounded - Registration Act, 1908 -
s. 49.
Respondent-a member of Scheduled Tribe sold his immovable property to
appellant. Appellant paid the consideration amount for the same, and
respondent gave the possession of the property to the appellant. However,
the permission for such transfer was not granted. Appellant filed a suit
for recovery of the consideration amount. He relied on the agreement which
was sought to be registered as a sale deed. As the document was not duly
stamped, the court impounded the same. The challenge against the order was
not entertained by High Court.
In appeal to this Court, appellant contended that since the unregistered
sale deed was sought to be put in evidence only for the purpose of recovery
of the consideration amount i.e. for collateral purpose, the provisions of
ss. 33 and 35 of Stamp Act, shall not be attracted. .
| Download Judgement |
| 31 |
PHOOL PATTI AND ANR. Vs. RAM SINGH(DEAD)THROUGH LRS. & ANR. |
Registration Act 1908 |
31/03/2009 |
Registration Act, 1908: s.17(2)(vi) - Exception in s.17(2)(vi) -
Interpretation of - Inconsistency between the decisions of Supreme Court
regarding interpretation of exception in s.17(2)(vi) - Matter referred to
larger Bench - Reference to larger Bench.
Appeal: First appellate court - Finding of first appellate court that
consent decree in another suit was not collusive was a finding of fact -
High Court rightly refused to interfere with the findings of fact.
Interpretation of statutes: Court cannot add words to the statute or change
its language, particularly when on a plain reading the meaning is clear.
The appellants were daughters of one `B'. They filed a suit No. 234 of 1982
challenging a consent decree dated 24.11.1980 in Civil Suit No.630 of 1980
on the ground that same was collusive. The trial court decreed the suit.
However, first appellate court set aside the order of trial court. High
Court dismissed the appeal. Hence the present appeal. |
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| 32 |
SURAJ LAMP & INDUSTRIES (P) LD.TR.DIR. Vs. STATE OF HARYANA & ANR. |
Registration Act 1908 |
15/05/2009 |
Registration Act, 1908:
ss. 17 and 49 - Registration of deeds of conveyance - Purpose of - Practice
of transferring freehold properties by means of sale agreement with General
Power of Attorney and Will (SA-GPA-Will) |
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| 32 |
RAJNI TANDON Vs. DULAL RANJAN GHOSH DASTIDAR & ANR. |
registration Act 1908 |
29/07/2009 |
Registration Act, 1908: ss.32 and 33 - Power of attorney (POA) holder
executing a document on behalf of principal - Entitlement of POA holder to
present the document for registration - Held: POA holder becomes actual
executant and is entitled to present it for registration and get it
registered in terms of s.32(a) - He does not fall under s.32(c) and hence
s.33 would not apply - Interpretation of statutes.
Interpretation of statutes: Use of the word `or' is used to signify the
disjunctive nature of a provision.
The questions which arose for consideration in the present appeal were
whether a person who executes a document under the terms of power of
attorney becomes an actual executant of the document and entitled under
Section 32(a) of the Registration Act to present it for registration and
get it registered and whether a power of attorney to execute a document is
recognizable only if it is registered and authenticated under Section 33(1)
(c) of the Act. |
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| 33 |
S.KALADEVI Vs. V.R.SOMASUNDARAM & ORS. |
Registration Act 1908 |
12/04/2010 |
Registration Act, 1908: s.49, proviso - Unregistered sale deed is
admissible in evidence in a suit for specific performance of the contract -
Evidence Act, 1872 - Specific performance - Transfer of property Act, 1882.
The question which arose for consideration in the present appeal was
whether the courts below erred in holding that an unregistered sale deed
was not admissible in evidence in a suit for specific performance of the
contract. |
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| 34 |
N.O.I.D.A. Vs. ARMY WELFARE HOUSING ORGANISATION & ORS. |
Registration Act 1908 |
10/09/2010 |
Transfer of Property:
Transfer of land cum super-structure - Land allotted by NOIDA to
respondent-societies pursuant to execution of lease deed - Super-structure
built on the land - Notices issued by NOIDA directing individual members of
the housing societies to execute tripartite deeds with the housing
societies, as the lessee, and NOIDA, as the lessor, for sale of the super-
structure - Propriety of - Held: Proper - The impugned notices postulating
the execution of tripartite deeds flow not only from the clauses of the
lease deed but also from the supervisory authority placed on NOIDA by
virtue of the provisions of s.7 of the Act - Transfer of the land cum
super-structure would be by way of a sub-lease from the lessor i.e. NOIDA
to the lessee (respondents-housing societies) to the sub-lessees who are
the individual allottees, by way of a stamped and registered document -
Uttar Pradesh Industrial Development Act, 1976 - ss.7 and 14.
Registration Act, 1908 - ss.17(1)(d) and 49 - Transfer of Property Act,
1882 - s.107 - Payment of stamp duty on lease - Lease deed / sub-lease of
immovable property - Held: Is compulsorily registerable u/s.17(1)(d) of the
Registration Act and s.107 of the Transfer of Property Act - In absence of
such a document, s.49 of the Registration Act visualizes no legal effect or
an effective transfer by way of a lease or sub-lease.
Land was allotted by New Okhla Industrial Development Area (NOIDA) to
respondents-housing societies pursuant to execution of a lease deed by and
between them. The respondents-housing societies filed writ petition
challenging the letters/notices by which NOIDA had directed the individual
members of the housing societies to execute tripartite deeds, the other two
parties being the Housing Societies, as the lessee, and NOIDA, as the
lessor, for sale of the super-structure built on the land allotted by NOIDA
to these Societies, and for further restraining the State Government, NOIDA
etc. from charging any stamp duty on the execution of the deeds.
The respondents pleaded that the super-structure on the land allotted by
NOIDA had been built solely on the contributions made by the individual
members; that the Societies being the lessees of the land in question were
not the owners of the super-structure so as to bind the individual members
to the covenants that had been subscribed to by the Societies with NOIDA
the lessor and further that NOIDA had not contributed anything towards the
cost of construction of the super-structures.
The writ petition was allowed by the High Court primarily on the ground
that the lease deed referred only to the transfer of the land and there was
no reference whatsoever that the building constructed thereon at a later
stage would also be treated to have been demised by the lessor; that the
allottee members, as owners of the flats/apartments, built from the
contributions made by them could not be compelled to purchase it from the
society and that such a transfer will be fictitious and involuntary, and
thus a void transaction under the Indian Contract Act. Accordingly, the
High Court set aside the impugned notices issued by NOIDA directing the
respondents to enter into the tripartite deeds and restrained NOIDA from
compelling the respondents to execute the tripartite sale deed of super
structure of flat and sub lease deed of land, and from requiring payment of
any stamp duty and registration fees on such documents. |
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| 35 |
HAR NARAIN (D) BY LRS. Vs. MAM CHAND (D) BY LRS. & ORS. |
Registration Act 1908 |
08/10/2010 |
Specific Relief Act, 1963 - s.19(b) - Protection under - Scope - Landed
property - Respondent no.1-owner entered into agreement for sale with
appellant - But subsequently executed sale deed in respect of same property
in favour of respondent nos.2 to 6 - Appellant filed suit for specific
performance against respondent no.1 - Sale deed executed in favour of
respondent nos.2 to 6 registered subsequent to institution of the suit -
Trial Court dismissed the suit holding that the sale deed executed in
favour of respondent nos.2 to 6 was not subject to the doctrine of lis
pendens, and, that respondent nos. 2 to 6 were bonafide purchasers for
consideration without notice - Order upheld by first appellate court and
High Court - Justification of - Held: Not justified - The sale executed by
respondent No.1 in favour of respondent Nos. 2 to 6 could not be termed as
a complete sale until the document got registered - In view of s.47 of the
Registration Act, the registration related back to the date of execution
but it does not mean that sale would be complete in favour of respondent
Nos. 2 to 6 prior to the date of registration of the sale deed - As the
sale stood completed during the pendency of the suit, doctrine of lis
pendens is applicable - Moreover, appellant had been in possession of the
suit land since long and this fact had also been mentioned by respondent
No.1 in the sale deed in favour of respondent Nos. 2 to 6, therefore, the
question of respondent Nos. 2 to 6 being bonafide purchasers for value and
having paid money in good faith without notice does not arise - Respondents
No.2 to 6, therefore, cannot take the benefit of the provisions of s.19(b)
of the Specific Relief Act - Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - s.54 -
Registration Act, 1908 - s.47 - Doctrines - Doctrine of lis pendens.
Maxim - `pendente lite, nihil innovetur' - Applicability of.
Respondent no.1-owner entered into an agreement for sale with the appellant
in respect of certain landed property. However, subsequently, on 2.8.1971,
respondent No.1 executed a sale deed in respect of the same property in
favour of respondent nos.2 to 6.
Aggrieved, the appellant filed a suit for specific performance against
respondent no.1. The sale deed executed in favour of respondents 2 to 6 was
registered subsequent to the institution of the suit (on 3-9-1971). The
trial court dismissed the suit holding that the sale deed would be deemed
to have come into force on 2-8-1971, as the registration thereof dated
3-9-1971 would relate back to the date of execution (by virtue of the
application of the provisions of Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908)
which was prior to institution of the suit for specific performance and
thus, the doctrine of lis pendens would not apply; and that respondents 2
to 6 were bona fide purchasers for consideration without notice and,
therefore, the sale deed in their favour was to be protected. The order was
upheld by the first appellate court as well as the High Court.
The questions for consideration in the instant appeal were: 1) whether the
sale deed executed by respondent No.1 in favour of respondent nos.2 to 6
could be subject to the doctrine of lis pendens and 2) whether respondent
nos.2 to 6 could held to be vendees without notice of an agreement to sell
in favour of the appellant by respondent no.1. |
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| 36 |
T.G.ASHOK KUMAR Vs. GOVINDAMMAL & ANR. |
registration Act 1908 |
08/12/2010 |
Transfer of Property Act, 1882: s.52 - Transfer of property by a defendant
pending a partition suit - Partition suit found to be not collusive -
Decree in partition suit - In terms of decree, the pendente lite transferor
found to have only half share in the property and she was allotted only one
fourth of the property purchased by the transferee - Suit by transferee for
declaration of title and permanent injunction in regard to transferred
property - Courts below dismissed the suit - Held: Suit ought not to have
been dismissed in entirety even if the sale was hit by the Doctrine of lis
pendens - Transferee's title will be saved in respect of that part of the
transferred property allotted to the transferor in the partition suit -
Transfer in regard to the remaining portion of the transferred property to
which the transferor is found not entitled, will be invalid and the
transferee will not get any right, title or interest in that portion.
Transfer of Property: Suggestion to Law makers - Absence of a mechanism for
prospective purchasers to verify whether a property is subject to any
pending suit or a decree or attachment cause lot of hardship, loss, anxiety
and leads to unnecessary litigation - All these inconveniences, risks and
misery could be avoided and the property litigations could be reduced to a
considerable extent, if there is some satisfactory and reliable method by
which a prospective purchaser can ascertain whether any suit is pending (or
whether the property is subject to any decree or attachment) before he
decides to purchase the property - Law Commission and the Parliament much
consider such amendment or other suitable amendment to cover the existing
void in title verification or due diligence procedures - Also, registration
of agreements of sale should be made compulsory to reduce property
litigation - Registration Act, 1908 - Legislation.
Appeal: Appeal before Supreme Court - Concurrent findings of facts by the
three courts below that the partition suit was not collusive - Interference
with - Held: Not called for - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 136.
The appellant filed a suit for declaration of his right and title and
permanent injunction in regard to the suit property. The case of the
appellant was that he purchased the suit property from the second
respondent under sale deed dated 11.4.1990 and he was a bona fide purchaser
and was unaware of the partition suit between the second respondent and the
first respondent who was the step daughter of the second respondent. On
17.3.1994, the said suit for partition was decreed by preliminary decree
whereby the two respondents were held entitled to half share each in the
properties including the suit property. In the final decree proceedings,
the Commissioner divided the suit property in such a manner that nearly
three-fourth portion of the suit property was allotted to the share of the
first respondent and only about a one-fourth portion was allotted to the
share of the second respondent.
The first respondent resisted the suit contending that the appellant had
purchased the suit property during the pendency of her suit for partition;
and that being a purchaser pendente lite, the sale in his favour was hit by
the doctrine of lis pendens and, therefore, he could not claim any right in
the suit property; and she denied that there was any collusion between her
and the second respondent. The second respondent did not contest the suit.
The trial court dismissed the suit on the ground that the sale in favour of
the appellant was hit by the doctrine of lis pendens. The appeal filed by
the appellant was dismissed by the first appellate court. The High Court
dismissed the second appeal. Aggrieved, the appellant filed the instant
appeal. |
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| 37 |
HAFEEZA BIBI & ORS. Vs. SHAIKH FARID(DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS. |
Registration Act 1908 |
05/05/2011 |
Mohammadan law:
Hiba (gift) - Essential requisites of - Held: Are: (1) declaration of the
gift by the donor, (2) acceptance of the gift by the donee and (3) delivery
of possession -The rules of Mohammadan Law do not make writing essential to
the validity of a gift and an oral gift fulfilling all the three essentials
make the gift complete and irrevocable - However, the donor may record the
transaction of gift in writing - In the instant case, as all the three
essential requisites are satisfied by the gift deed - The gift in favour of
defendant 2 became complete and irrevocable -Judgment of High Court set
aside and that of trial court, holding the gift deed genuine and binding
between the parties, restored -Transfer of Property Act - ss. 129 and 123.
Transfer of Property Act, 1882:
ss. 123 and 129 - Deed of gift executed by a Mohammadan - HELD: Is not the
instrument effecting, creating or making the gift - Such writing is not a
document of title but is a piece of evidence - Section 129 preserves the
rule of Mohammadan Law and excludes the applicability of s. 123 to a gift
of an immovable property by a Mohammadan - In the instant case, the gift
deed is a form of declaration by the donor and not an instrument of gift as
contemplated u/s 17 of the Registration Act - Registration Act, 1908 -
s.17.
In a suit for partition between the parties governed by Sunni Law,
defendant no. 2 set up the defence that his father executed a hiba (gift
deed) on 5.2.1968 and gifted his properties to him, and put him in
possession of the hiba properties. The trial court held the hiba as true,
valid and binding between the parties, and dismissed the suit. In the
appeal, before the High Court it was contended for the plaintiffs that the
gift deed dated 5-2-1968 being in writing was compulsorily required to be
registered and stamped and in the absence thereof the gift deed could not
be accepted and relied upon. The High Court allowed the appeal and remanded
the matter to the trial court for passing a preliminary decree. |
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| 38 |
M/S SMS TEA ESTATES P.LTD. Vs. M/S CHANDMARI TEA CO.P.LTD. |
Registration Act 1908 |
20/07/2011 |
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996:
ss. 11 and 16(1)(a) read with s.49 of Registration Act and ss. 33, 35, 38
and 40 of Stamp Act - Arbitration clause in an unregistered lease deed
granting lease of two tea states for 30 years - Dispute between the parties
- Application for appointment of arbitrator - Rejected by Chief Justice of
High Court - HELD: An arbitration agreement does not require registration
under the Registration Act - When a contract contains an arbitration
clause, it is a collateral term relating to the resolution of disputes,
unrelated to the performance of the contract - Therefore, having regard to
the proviso to s. 49 of Registration Act read with s.16(1)(a) of the 1966
Act, an arbitration agreement in an unregistered but compulsorily
registrable document can be acted upon and enforced for the purpose of
dispute resolution by arbitration - However, having regard to s. 35, unless
the stamp duty and penalty due in respect of the instrument is paid, the
court cannot act upon the instrument, which means that it cannot act upon
the arbitration agreement also which is part of the instrument - Procedure
to be adopted where the arbitration clause is contained in a document which
is not registered (but compulsorily registrable) and which is not duly
stamped summed up - Order of the High Court set aside and the matter
remitted to the Chief Justice of the High Court to first decide the issue
of stamp duty, and if the document is duly stamped, then appoint an
arbitrator in accordance with law - Registration Act, 1908 - s.49, proviso
- Stamp Act, 1899 - ss. 33,35,38 and 40.
The respondent, under a lease deed dated 21.12.2006, granted lease of its
two tea estates with all appurtenances to the appellant for a term of 30
years. Clause 35 of the said lease deed provided for settlement of disputes
between the parties by arbitration. It was the case of the appellant that
prior to the execution of the said lease deed, on 29.11.2006 the respondent
had offered to sell the said two tea estates to the appellant for a
consideration of Rupees four crores and the appellant agreed to purchase
them subject to detailed verification; the appellant wrote a letter dated
27.6.2007 to the respondent agreeing to purchase the said two tea estates;
the appellant invested huge sums of money for improving the tea estates in
the expectation that it would either be purchasing the said estates or have
a lease for 30 years; the respondent, however, abruptly and illegally
evicted the appellant from the tea estates and took over their management
in January 2008; the appellant issued a notice dated 5.5.2008 calling upon
the respondent to refer the matter to arbitration under Clause 35 of the
lease deed and, ultimately, filed an application for appointment of
arbitrator. The Chief Justice of the Guwahati High Court dismissed the
application holding that the lease deed was compulsorily registrable u/s 17
of the Registration Act and s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act; and as
the lease deed was not registered, no term therein could be relied upon for
any purpose and, therefore, Clause 35 could not be relied upon for seeking
reference to arbitration. The High Court also held that the arbitration
agreement contained in Clause 35 could not be termed as a collateral
transaction and, therefore, the proviso to s 49 of the Registration Act
would not assist the appellant.
In the instant appeal, the questions for consideration before the Court
were: (i) "Whether an arbitration agreement contained in an unregistered
(but compulsorily registrable) instrument is valid and enforceable?" (ii)
"Whether an arbitration agreement in an unregistered instrument which is
not duly stamped, is valid and enforceable?" and (iii) "Whether there is an
arbitration agreement between the appellant and respondent and whether an
Arbitrator should be appointed?" |
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| 39 |
RAMESH KUMAR & ANR. Vs. FURU RAM & ANR. ETC. |
Registration Act 1908 |
18/08/2011 |
SUIT:
Suits for declaration that the decrees obtained in suits filed u/ss 14 and
17 of Arbitration Act were null and void as they were vitiated by fraud -
Decreed by trial court on the ground that the arbitration awards were not
registered - First appellate court and High Court dismissed the suits
holding that the suits were filed only for declaring that the arbitration
agreements and awards were invalid and the suit for such declaration were
not maintainable in view of ss. 32 and 33 of Arbitration Act - HELD:
Challenge to the validity of the arbitration agreement and the awards was
incidental to challenge to the order making the awards rule of the court
and the decrees drawn in pursuance of such orders - Therefore, ss. 32 and
33 were no bar to the suits - The decrees in suits u/s 14 and 17 of
Arbitration Act were obtaining by committing fraud upon the plaintiffs, the
court and the State Government evading liability to pay stamp duty and
registration charges - Judgment of first appellate court and High Court set
aside and judgments and decrees of trial court decreeing the suits
restored.
ARBITRATION ACT, 1940:
ss. 14 and 17 - Reference agreements - Awards -Applications for making the
awards rule of the court- HELD: The entire procedure was fraudulent as (i)
there was no dispute between the parties, (ii) there was no reference of
any dispute to arbitration, (iii) the reference agreements were prepared
and executed in pursuance of a pre-existing arrangement to have collusive
awards and (iv) the arbitrator was not required to decide any dispute
between the parties nor was there any adjudication of the dispute by the
arbitrator - Reference to arbitration was to avoid stamp duty and
registration charges - Obtaining sham and collusive arbitration awards when
there was no dispute and then obtaining a nominal decree in terms of the
said awards would be a fraud committed upon the court and the State
Government by evading liability to pay the stamp duty and registration
charges - The irregularities, illegalities, suppressions and
misrepresentations which culminated in the orders making the awards the
rule of the court and directing that the awards be made decrees of the
court, show that the decrees in terms of the awards were obtained by fraud
- Stamp fraud - Registration Act, 1908 - s. 17 - Administration of justice
- Fraud committed upon court.
FRAUD - Connotation of - Explained.
REGISTRATION ACT, 1908:
ss. 17 and 49 - Compulsorily registrable documents - Held: If the decree or
order of the court is not rendered on merits, but expressed to be made on a
compromise and comprises any immoveable property which was not the subject
mater of the suit or proceeding, such order or decree is compulsorily
registrable - Further, clause (iv) of sub-s. (2) of s. 17 excludes decrees
or orders but does not exclude awards of arbitrator - Any arbitration award
which purports or operates to create, declare any right, title or interest
in any immovable property of the value of more than Rs. 100 is compulsorily
registrable - In the instant case, the awards are clearly documents which
purport or operate to create and declare a right, title or interest in an
immoveable property of the value of more than Rs.100 which was not the
subject matter of the dispute or reference to arbitration - Therefore, the
awards were compulsorily registrable, but as they were not registered they
could not be acted upon u/s 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 nor could a
decree be passed in terms of such unregistered awards.
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950:
Article 136 - Scope of - Held: Normally Supreme Court would not interfere
with a finding of fact relating to fraud and misrepresentation - But, in
the instant case, as material evidence produced by the plaintiffs-
appellants had been ignored and as the courts below failed to draw proper
inferences therefrom and had ignored a cause of fraud, the Court is
constrained to interfere with reference to a question of fact - When the
first appellate court and High Court held that the decree was not null and
void, the plaintiffs-appellants were entitled to urge all grounds to show
that the entire transaction and arbitration proceedings were fraudulent and
the decree was also a result of fraud - In the instant case, there is
variance and divergence between the pleading and documentary evidence,
pleading and oral evidence and between the oral and documentary evidence -
It is well settled that no amount of evidence contrary to the pleading can
be relied on or accepted - It is thus clear that the entire case of the
respondents is liable to be rejected - The different versions clearly
demonstration fraud and misrepresentation on the part of the respondents -
Pleadings - Evidence.
ADVOCATE:
Acts of an advocate in arbitration proceedings and before the court - An
advocate engaged by respondents through their counsel to make awards in
their favour - He was appointed as an arbitrator - On the following day, he
made the awards and gave the same to respondents - He signed the written
statements of defendants (appellants) in the proceedings u/ss 14 and 17 of
Arbitration Act as their counsel - Though he was the third defendant in the
said two suits, he appeared as the counsel for defendants 1 and 2 without
their consent or knowledge - He made a statement before the court in the
proceedings u/ss 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act on behalf of defendants 1
and 2 that they have no objection for decrees being made - Held: The acts
of the advocate are fraudulent.
The appellants filed two suits bearing C.S. No. 63 of 1997 and C.S. No. 64
of 1997 in the Court of the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Kurukshetra
against `FR' and `KR' (the respondents in the instant appeals) seeking
declaration that the judgments and decrees dated 30.3.1992 in two suits
bearing C. S. No. 366 of 1992 and C.S. No. 367 of 1992 u/ss 14 and 17 of
the Arbitration Act, 1940 were null and void. It was also claimed that the
agreements dated 12.3.1992 and the awards dated 13.3.1992 and the
proceedings in the said suits before the Court of Sr. Sub-Judge,
Kurukshetra and the mutation proceedings pursuant to the said decrees were
all null and void. The case of the plaintiffs-appellants was that they were
brothers and co-owners of lands measuring 98 kanals and 19 marlas; that
they entered into an agreement to sell the said lands to the sons of two
brothers, namely, `FR' and `KR' for a sum of Rs. 14,22,000/- and received
Rs. 1,00,000/- as earnest money. Since the respondents did not pay the
money and failed to get the sale completed by the stipulated date, it was
decided in a panchayat that the appellants would permit the respondents to
cultivate their said lands for a period of one and a half years without any
rent in satisfaction and discharge of the claim of refund of Rs.
1,00,000/-. The respondents on the pretext of reducing the terms of the
settlement into writing took the plaintiffs to Kurukshetra and got some
papers signed by them and, made them to appear in court in that regard.
Subsequently, during the pendency of a pre-emption suit, the plaintiffs
came to know about the proceedings and the decrees drawn in C.S. No.
366/1992 and C.S. No. 367/1992. The respondents-defendants in their written
statements alleged that they were ready to get the sale deeds registered
but the appellants evaded and, therefore, the matter was referred to
arbitration and the awards made by the arbitrator and the decrees made in
terms of the awards were lawful and valid. The trial court decreed the
suits holding that the awards were compulsorily registrable and as the same
were not registered under the Registration Act, they were invalid and the
consequent judgments and decrees were also invalid. However, the first
appellate court and the High Court in second appeal held in favour of the
defendants-respondents holding that the suits for declaration were not
maintainable.
In the instant appeals filed by the plaintiffs, the questions for
consideration before the Court were: (i) whether the suits by appellants
were not maintainable; (ii) whether the courts below were justified in
holding that there was no fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the
respondents in obtaining the decrees in terms of the awards dated
13.3.1992; (iii) whether the arbitration awards dated 13.3.1992 were
invalid for want of registration; and (iv) whether the orders dated
30.3.1992 directing that the said awards be made the rule of the court were
invalid. |
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| 40 |
SURAJ LAMP & INDUSTRIES (P) LD.TR.DIR. Vs. STATE OF HARYANA & ANR. |
Registration Act 1908 |
11/10/2011 |
Transfer of property:
Transactions under Sale Agreement/General Power of Attorney/ Will
(SA/GPA/Will) - HELD: Immovable property can be legally and lawfully
transferred/conveyed only by a registered deed of conveyance - Courts will
not treat transactions of the nature of `GPA sales' or `SA/GPA/Will
transfers' as completed or concluded transfers or as conveyances, since
they neither convey title nor do they create any interest in an immovable
property - Such transactions cannot be recognized as valid mode of transfer
of immoveable property - They cannot be recognized as deeds of title,
except to the limited extent of s. 53A of the TP Act nor can they be relied
upon or made the basis for mutations in Municipal or revenue records - It
is time that an end is put to the pernicious practice of SA/GPA/Will
transactions known as GPA sales - Directions given as regards SA/GPAs/Wills
entered before the date of the instant judgment - Transfer of Property Act,
1882 - ss. 5,53,53-A, 54 and 55 - Power of Attorney Act, 1882 - ss. 1-A and
2 - Succession Act, 1925 - ss. 69 and 70 - Stamp Act, 1899 - ss. 23 and 27
- Registration Act, 1908 - ss. 17 and 49.
Deeds and Documents:
Sale agreement/General Power of Attorney/Will - Scope of - Advantages of
registration of documents which purport or operate to create, declare,
assign, limit or extinguish any right title or interest - Explained.
In Suraj Lamp and Industries Pvt. Ltd.1, the Supreme Court pointing out
ill-effects of transfer of immovable property under Sale Agreements/General
Power of Attorney/Will (`SA/GPA/ Will transfers), asked the Solicitor
General to give suggestions on behalf of the Union of India. The Court also
directed notice to issue to the States of Delhi, Haryana, Punjab and Uttar
Pradesh to give their views on the matter. All the four States responded
and confirmed that `SA/GPA/Will transfers' were required to be discouraged
as they led to loss of revenue and increase in litigation due to defective
title. |
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| 41 |
SARDAR SINGH Vs. KRISHNA DEVI |
Registration Act 1908 |
26/04/1994 |
Registration Act, 1908 : Sections 17 and 49-Compulsory registration of documents-Immovable property-Dispute-Arbitrators-Award--Registra-tion of-When Compulsory-Held unregistered award is not per se inadmis-sible in evidence-Registration is compulsory if the award creates a title or interest in immovable property for the first time-If it contains a mere decla-ration of a pre-existing right then registration is not compulsory.
Private Arbitrator-Award pertaining to immovable property-Nature of-Held non-testamentary instrument under section 17(1)(b).
Specific Relief Act, 1963 : Section 20-Suit for specific perfor-mance-Court-Power to grant relief is discretionary-Conduct of parties may disentitle them to relief.
Section 12-Specific performance of part of contract-House-Co-par-ceners and co-owner brothers in joint possession-Sale by one brother-Other brother not a party to the agreement-Purchaser not making enquiries as to whether vendor-brother had exclusive title-Suit for specific performance-Grant of decree in respect of entire property held not justified-Held purchaser was entitled to enforce decree to the extent of half-share of vendor-brother only.
The appellant's brother purchased a house from the Ministry of Rehabilitation for which a sale certificate was issued in his name. The appellant raised a dispute claiming half share in the property which was referred to private arbitrators for adjudication. The arbitrators gave their award holding that (i) though the sale deed was taken by the appellant's brother in his name benami but actually the appellant and his brother were the owners of the said house in equal shares from the date of purchase; (ii) the price of the house was contributed half and half by both the brothers. The said award was not got registered but on an application made by the appellant under section 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 it was made a rule of the Court. Thereafter the appellant obtained orders for eviction of the tenants from the building in question for his personal occupation and consequently got possession also. In the meantime the appellant's brother entered into an agreement of sale with the respondent, who was his neighbourer, for the entire property and the latter filed a suit for specific performance of the contract. The appellant got himself im-pleaded in the said suit as defendant but the Trial Court negatived his claim that he was owner of half of the property and decreed the suit in respect of entire property holding that (i) the appellant's title was founded upon the award to acquire title or to divest the title of the appellant's brother; (ii) the award was compulsorily registrable under section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 and being unregistered it was inadmissible in evidence as a source of title under section 49. On appeal the High Court confirmed the decree of the trial court.
In appeal to this Court Court on the question whether (i) the award was compulsorily registrable under section 17 of the Registration Act; and (ii) the Courts below were justified in decreeing the suit for specific performance: |
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| 42 |
MRS. MARY JOYCE POONACHA V. Vs. M/S. K.T. PLANTATIONS PVT. LTD. & ORS.(K RAMASWAMY &N. VE) |
Registration Act 1908 |
19/01/1995 |
Registration Act, 1908-Sections 34(3), 72 & 73-Registration-Sale deed for
land-Executant not present at time of registration-Execution of sale deed
in controversy-Civil suit pending-Registration refused-Appeal-Prayer to
stay proceedings-Whether Registrar was right in proceeding with hearing of
appeal-Held, No.
One D had allegedly executed a sale deed but the same was not registered.
Respondent filed a civil suit for. declaration that the said sale deed
executed by D in his favour was valid and binding on her. The alleged
executant D denied the execution of the sale deed and the agreements to
sell in favour of the respondent No. 1. She alleged that the agreements and
deed of sale were initiated by fraud and were unenforceable in the eye of
law.
The Sub-Registrar refused to register the document. On appeal, when the
Registrar was proceeding to hear the appeal to register the document, the
appellant sought for stay of further proceedings in view of the pendency of
the suit. The Registrar declined to stay the proceedings. The appellant
filed writ petition in the High Court which was dismissed. Writ Appeal
filed against the judgment was also dismissed. Hence this Appeal.
The question raised for consideration was whether the District Registrar
was right in proceeding with the hearing of the appeal and whether the High
Court was right in declining to stay the proceedings before the District
Registrar. |
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| 43 |
STATE OF GUJARAT ETC.ETC. Vs. DAYA SHAMJI BHAI ETC.ETC. |
Registration Act 1908 |
25/08/1995 |
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 : Sections 11, 12, 18 and 31(1).
Reference Court-Power to enhance compensation-Agreement-land-owner's
agreeing to receive compensation in terms of agreement and forego the right
of reference-Payment of compensation accordingly-Held land-owners have no
light to seek reference-Civil Court has not jurisdiction to go into
adequacy of the compensation-Agreement entered under Section 11(2) needs no
registration.
Indian Registration Act, 1908 :
Agreement under section 11(2) of Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Registration
of-field not required.
The respondents-land owners, whose lands were acquired, entered into
agreements under section 11(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 whereunder
they consented to accept the compensation determined by the Land
Acquisition Officer and 25% more thereof and agreed to forego their right
to seek reference under Section 18. However, after accepting compensation
in terms of the agreements, they sought reference under section 18 of the
Act. The reference Court enhanced the compensation and rejected the State's
reliance on the agreement on the ground that they were not registered under
the Registration Act. On appeals preferred by State the High Court
confirmed the judgment of the reference Court. Against the decision of the
High Court State preferred appeals before this Court. |
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| 44 |
SANTOSH JAYASWAL AND ANOTHER Vs. STATE OF M.P. AND OTHERS |
Registration Act 1908 |
11/09/1995 |
Indian Registration Act, 1908/Indian Stamp Act, 1899/M.P. General Clauses
Act, 1957/Transfer of Property Act, J882 :
Ss.l7(l)(c) and (d)ls.2(16), Schedule I, Article 35(a)/s.2(18)/s.3-
Immovable property-Grant of benefit arising out of-Right to catch fish-
Held, being a Profit arising out of immovable property is "immovable
property"-Is profit a prendre-Installment is compulsorily registrable under
Registration Act and required to be engrossed with necessary stamp duty
under Stamp Act.
The respondent-State Government granted to the appellants right to catch
fish in the tanks. On the requirement of registration of the instruments
under Indian Registration Act, 1908 and levy of stamp duty under Indian
Stamp Act, 1899, it was contended before the Division Bench of the High
Court that since the profit a prendre was not immovable property, the
instruments were not required to be registered. The High Court rejected the
claim. Aggrieved, the appellant filed the appeals by special leave.
It was contended on behalf of the appellants that right to catch fish was
in the nature of licence and as such the instruments were neither
compulsorily registrable under the Registration Act nor liable to stamp
duty under the Stamp Act. |
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| 45 |
KHAGESH KUMAR & ORS. Vs. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF REGISTRATION & ORS. |
Registration act 1908 |
27/09/1995 |
Service Law-U.P. Regulation of Ad Hoc Appointment (On post out-side the
purview of the Public Sector Commission) Rules, 1979-Rule 4-Registration
Clerks employed on daily wage basis-Regularisation of-Directions issued.
The petitioners were appointed as Registration Clerks on daily wage basis
for short period/periods in an year and on the expiry of the period their
services were terminated. Such appointments were authorised by the Governor
for the particular year only subject to the condition that the posting of
Registration Clerks on daily wage basis shall in no case exceed three
months in the year. Some of them were appointed on the same basis in the
next succeeding year or after a gap of one or two years.
A number of writ petitions were filed in the High Court by persons who had
worked as registration clerks on daily wage basis in the past or who were
actually working as Registration Clerks on daily wage basis wherein the
petitioners sought regularisation of their appointment on the post of
registration clerk and prayed for quashing of the press notification
inviting applications for appointment on the post of registration clerks.
In a large number of cases interim orders had been passed directing that
the writ petitioners might be allowed to continue in service during the
pendency of the writ petitions.
Petitioners claimed before the High Court that they had been regularly
selected by a duly constituted Selection Committee and their appointment
should be treated as regular appointment; that they had been working on
daily wage basis for a number of years and, therefore, they were entitled
to be regularised on the post. The High Court rejected the claim of the
petitioners and held that nothing had been shown that the appointment of
the petitioners was made after selection through a Selection Committee;
that none of the petitioners were either ad hoc employees or even daily
wagers continuously for one year or for 240 days and that mere
advertisement in a paper about some posts lying vacant does not confer any right whatsoever on those who seek appointment in pursuance of the
advertisement and since the State had specifically stated that they did not
require anyone to be appointed as Registration Clerks in pursuance of the
advertisement dated March 24, 1991 and they were not proposing to process
the said advertisement any further, the said advertisement could not be
invoked by the petitioners to seek regularisation as Registration Clerks.
The High Court dismissed the Writ Petitions. Hence these petitions.
Petitioners urged that their appointment as Registration Clerks on daily
wage basis was made in accordance with the procedure laid down in paragraph
94-A read with paragraph 97 of the U.P. Registration Manual on the basis of
the list which was prepared under paragraph 97; that these provisions are
statutory rules framed under the Registration Act, 1908; that appointment
of a candidate whose name was included in the list of approved candidates
under para 97 of the Manual, as the said paragraph stood on 19-1-1974, was
to be treated as an appointment under rule 15 of the U.P. Registration
Department (District Establishment) Ministerial Service Rules 1978, since
the words 'as it stood in January 1974' in Rule 5(2) refer to paragraph 97
of the Manual; that there were vacancies on the post of Registration Clerks
and some of the petitioners had been working as Registration Clerks on
daily wage basis since much before 1.10.1986 and they would be entitled to
be considered for regularisation under the U.P. Regularisation of Ad Hoc
Appointments (on posts outside the purview of the Public Service
Commission) Rules, 1979; that many of them had rendered continuous service
for more than 240 days in a year and that they were entitled to be
regularised; that their services were availed as an apprentice under
provisions of paragraph 101 of the Manual, and finally that even if the
petitioners were not entitled to seek regularisation, they should be given
preference in the matter of appointment on the post of Registration Clerk
whenever regular appointment was made on that post.
The respondents submitted that the provision contained in paragraph 101 of
the Manual had been superseded and instructions had been issued by the
Inspector General of Registration not to engage any person under paragraph
101 and if any petitioner was required to work without payment as an
Apprentice, he will be paid emoluments for the said period. |
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| 46 |
S. NOORDEEN Vs. S. THIRU VENKITA REDDIAR & ORS. |
Registration Act 1908 |
07/02/1996 |
Registration Act, 1908 :
Ss. 17(1), 17(2)-Compromise decree-Whether compulsorily registerable-Such a
decree though passed on compromise, formed part of the decree and order of
the Court in Court proceedings-The immovable properties whose sale is
impugned in the instant case are not properties other than the subject
matter of the suit or proceedings-Therefore they are not required to be
compulsorily registered.
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 :
Order 38 Rule 8 r/w Order 21 Rule 58-Proceedings under. |
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| 47 |
ZILA DASTAVEJ LEKHAK ASSOCIATIONBANDA & ANR. Vs. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. |
Registration Act 1908 |
02/04/1996 |
Registration Act, 1908/U.P. Document Writers' Licence Rules, 1977.
Ss. 32 and 69/Rule 6(2)-Documents-Presentation of before Registration
Officer-Document Writers--Regulation of terms and conditions of-Document
Writers cannot challenge that part of the Rules which is unfavourable to
them while at the same time respecting the favourable part thereof since
they have no independent right de-hors the Rules-They cannot challenge the
power of Inspector General of Registration in making Rules regulating
conditions of document writers and conditions under which they become
eligible to be document writers-Advocates stand as a class by themselves-
They do not need any further certificate from Licensing Authority under the
Rules.
Advocates Act, 1961 :
S. 30-Advocate-Entitlement to draft pleadings and documents and present the
same before authority concerned-An advocate gets the right only by virtue
of practice of profession as advocate.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition (C) No. 3403 of 1993. |
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| 48 |
Registration Act 1908 |
MITHILESH KUMAR Vs. MANOHAR LAL |
30/10/1996 |
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